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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1951 TERM
HT.

CIVIL PRACTICE

C. P. A. §51-a and Interpleader
New York Civil Practice Act §51-a provides that a claimant
to a sum of money due on contract may not commence an action
for such sum after the expiration of one year from notice to the
claimant that an action commenced by a third party to recover
the same sum of money is pending. Under this section the court
may direct that the defendant obligor furnish an undertaking in
an amount to be fixed by the court pending expiration of the year
period. The court, before issuing an order pursuant to, §51-a,
must be shown that the claimant whose remedy is to be affected
cannot with due diligence be personally served with process within
the state.1
The Court of Appeals, in The Solicitor for the Affairs of his
'
Majesty's Treasury v. Bankers Trust Co., was recently confronted with the question of the defendant obligor's rights after
the expiration of the statutory period. A British national had
deposited funds with the defendant bank. A British law enacted
in 1947 required British subjects to exchange dollars for pounds
sterling. Upon refusal of the British subject to comply with that
law, the British solicitor made a demand on defendant and instituted action in New York for such subject's deposit in defendant
bank. The British subject, at all times residing in Scotland, was
served according to §51-a. The proceeding against defendant
bank was stayed for the period of one year, during which the
British subject failed to act. In the interim, defendant bank had
been required pursuant to §51-a to pay the contested sum into court.
Defendant then claimed that the money remained the property of
the British subject, who was said to be an indispensable party to
the action. Plaintiff moved to strike out the answer on the
grounds that the bank had no rizht to interpose a claim on behalf
of the British subject. and plaintiff declared that by the proceeding
pursuant to §51-a, the defendant is discharged from further
3
The broad question
liability as in an action for interpleader
presented was whether §51-a, included as it is under the general
heading "limitations of time", barred the British subject's right,
or only his remedy in New York. The Court regarded the question
1. Kon ,btInkeLederfabrick v. Chase National Bank, 177 Misc. 186, 30 N. Y. S.
2d 518 (Sup. Ct 1941), aff'd, 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 107 (1st Dep't 1941).
N. Y.
2. 279 App. Div. 565, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 372 (1st Dep't 1951), ree'd 107 N. E. 2d 455 (1952).
3. C. P. A. §§ 286, 287, 287 (d).
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as answered by its decision in Hanna v. Stedman,4 which held that
for the purposes of an action of interpleader, a debt is not a res
which permits an adjudication in rem, but rather requires in
personam jurisdiction of the parties., Thus the court held that
although the British subject's New York remedy was barred by
the statutory limitation of §51-a, defendant remained liable to
suit in sister states where it maintained assets and where different
periods of limitation were provided. The obvious fact that the
intent of §51-a was to protect New York debtors from double
liability, influenced the court's ultimate determination that the
defendant could apply for remission of the sum paid into court
and continue to defend the action.( The Court thus held 0. P. A.
§133, which provides for discharge of the debtor from liability upon
payment into court, inapplicable where, under §51-a, an indispensable party has failed to appear.7 The Court stated that the sole
purpose of the deposit of security was to protect plaintiff, and not
to discharge defendant from liability as in an action of interpleader. Thus §51-a was construed as a statute of limitation,
designed to protect New York debtors from double liability and
harassing suits. Where defendant has paid the money into court,
and where because a claimant does not appear, the danger of a
later suit in a foreign jurisdiction persists, the debtor is permitted
to defend on the ground that the indispensable party has not been
joined.
Power of a Court to Disqualify Attorneys
One of the inherent powers of all courts of record is the
power, in a proper case, to disqualify an attorney from appearing
in a matter pending before that court.8 For example, where an
attorney possesses privilezed information concerning an opposing
party the court may bar the attorney's appearance on the around
that the party's right fo a fair hearing may be preiudced' The
further power to discipline or suspend an attorney for professional
4. 230 N. Y. 326, 130 N. E. 566 (1921).
5. But see Feuchtwanger v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 288 N. Y. 342,
43 N. E. 2d 434 (1942) ; Note. 37 CoRN. L. Q. 533 (1952).
6. Bulletin #50

pp. 147-148 (1939) by Henry R. Fraser, Legislative Reporter

of the New York State Bar Assn.

7. C. P. A. § 133 reads: "A party bringing money into court pursuant to the direction of the court is discharged thereby from all further liability to the extent of the
money so paid."
8. Brozm v. Miller, 286 F. 944 (rI.

C. Cir., 1922).

9. Watson v. Watson, 171 Misc. 175, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 537 (Sup. Ct 1939).

